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Humans tend tomodify their attitudes to alignwithpast action. For example, after choosingbetween similarly valuedalternatives, people
rate the selected option as better than they originally did, and the rejected option as worse. However, it is unknown whether these
modifications in evaluation reflect an underlying change in the physiological representation of a stimulus’ expected hedonic value and
our emotional response to it. Here, we addressed this question by combining participants’ estimations of the pleasure they will derive
from future events, with brain imaging data recorded while they imagined those events, both before, and after, choosing between them.
Participants rated the selected alternatives as better after the decision stage relative to before,whereas discarded alternativeswere valued
less. Our functional magnetic resonance imaging findings reveal that postchoice changes in preference are tracked in caudate nucleus
activity. Specifically, the difference in blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal associatedwith the selected and rejected stimuli
was enhanced after a decision was taken, reflecting the choice that had just been made. This finding suggests that the physiological
representationof a stimulus’ expectedhedonic value is alteredbya commitment to it. Furthermore, before any revaluation inducedby the
decision process, our data show that BOLD signal in this same region reflects the choices we are likely to make at a later time.
Introduction
Actions not only reflect expectancies of hedonic outcome, but
also alter such expectations (Ariely and Norton, 2008). A classic
observation here is that after making a difficult choice between
two equally valued options, such as between two desirable job
offers, people subsequently value the selected alternative more
strongly then they initially had, and the discarded one less so. This
phenomena was first demonstrated experimentally in 1956 by
psychologist Jack Brehm. Brehm reported that after picking be-
tween two similarly valued home appliances, housewives subse-
quently asserted that the appliance they selected was even better
than they initially thought, and the rejected option was not that
great after all (Brehm, 1956). Cognitive dissonance theory, one of
the most influential theories in psychology, was introduced to
account for this pattern of findings (Festinger, 1957). According
to cognitive dissonance theory, having to make a choice between
two similarly desirable alternatives engenders psychological discom-
fort. This is because the decision conflicts with the desirable aspects
of the rejected alternative, and with the undesirable aspects of the
selected alternative (Festinger, 1957). According to the theory such
psychological tension is reduced by reevaluating the options post-
choice (for an alternative account see Bem, 1967).
Brehm’s experiment, known as the “free-choice paradigm”,
has been replicated numerous times (for a review see Harmon-
Jones and Mills, 1999). Recently, this intriguing effect was also
shown in amnesic patients who did not even remember which op-
tion they had chosen (Lieberman et al., 2001), in young children
(Egan et al., 2007), and in capuchin monkeys that had to choose
between different colored chocolate M&Ms (Egan et al., 2007). Al-
though initially themonkeys valued allM&Msequally, like humans,
they liked the unchosenM&M less after a decision wasmade. These
examples speak to the possibility that choice induced reevaluation is
mediated by relatively automatic processes that do not necessarily
depend on explicit memory (Lieberman et al., 2001) or highly
evolved cognitive mechanisms (Egan et al., 2007).
Whether selecting M&Ms, household appliances, jobs, or a
potential spouse it is unknown whether the act of choosing actu-
ally modulates our physiological representation of a stimulus’
expected hedonic value and our emotional response to it. If in-
deed this is the case, one would expect postchoice preference
change to be observed in brain regions implicated in processing
and predicting rewarding events, such as the striatum, nucleus
accumbens, amygdala, and ventral medial and orbital prefrontal
cortex (Delgado et al., 2003;Delgado, 2007; Seymour et al., 2007).
To investigate the relationship between choice and expected
hedonic value, we adapted the free-choice paradigm (Brehm,
1956) to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The
study had two specific goals. First, we wanted to identify a neu-
robiological expression of postchoice changes in valuation. Sec-
ond, we wished to address whether a choice between two equally
rated alternatives is arbitrary or in fact predetermined by mar-
ginal differences in hedonic value representations that can be
observed in the brain.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Fifteen volunteer participants were recruited through posted advertise-
ments. One participant was eliminated from the analysis because of ex-
cessive number of trials with no response (25%). A second participant
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was eliminated because of usage of incorrect button keys leaving 13 par-
ticipants (males 8, females 5; age range 18–32) in the analysis (for
similar sample sizes see Phelps et al., 2004;Delgado et al., 2005;Daw et al.,
2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Hasson et al., 2008). Before scanning
participants completed a screening form for significant medical condi-
tions. All participants gave informed consent and were paid for their
participation.
Stimuli and procedure
Overview. We obtained fMRI data while participants imagined taking a
vacation in different destinations (e.g., Thailand, Greece). Participants
were then asked to indicate how happy they estimated they would feel
vacationing in each of these destinations. Subsequently, participants
were presented with pairs of destinations they had rated equally, and
were required to choose at which one they would rather take a vacation
(2/3 of the trials, critical condition). In another condition participants
were presentedwith easy choices involving presentation of locations they
had rated unequally (1/3 of the trials, noncritical condition). Participants
were not aware during the first scanning session that they would be
required to make these later choices. In a postchoice scanning session
participants imagined and rated the destinations again.
Stimuli consisted of 80 names of vacation destinations. The order in
which stimuli were presented was random. Before the scanning session
participants went through four practice trials. The session began with a
short structural scan, followed by four functional scan sessions. Finally,
an additional longer structural scan was performed. Stimuli were pre-
sented via a mirror mounted on the head coil.
Scanning sessions. Scanning sessions 1 and 3were 14min 40 s each, and
consisted of eighty trials of 11 s. On each trial a name of a vacation
destination appeared on screen for 6 s. The participants were instructed
to imagine themselves spending next year’s vacation at that location. The
participant then had 2 s to rate how happy they estimate they would be if
they were to vacation at that location (1, unhappy; 2, a bit unhappy; 3,
neutral; 4, happy; 5, very happy; 6, extremely happy). Responses were
made using a button box in the left-hand for ratings 1–3, and a button
box in the right-hand for ratings 4–6. If the participant did not respond
that trial was excluded from the final data analysis. Finally a fixation cross
was presented for 3 s.
Reaction times (RTs) did not differ for subsequently chosen versus
rejected stimuli in the critical condition in either session, and no
interaction was found between decision (chosen/rejected) and scan
(prechoice/postchoice). In the noncritical condition reaction times
were shorter for subsequently chosen versus rejected stimuli in scan 3
(p  0.05). Overall, reaction times were shorter in the third scanning
session (0.73 s) than the first scanning session (0.83 s; p 0.05).
The order in which the stimuli was presented in the first scan was not
related to subsequent choice (i.e., subjects were not more likely to chose
stimuli that were imagined later in the scan or earlier in the scan) in the
critical condition ( p 0.8), although a trend was observed in the non-
critical condition ( p 0.07).
Scanning session 2 was 6 min long and consisted of forty trials of 9 s
each. On each trial two names of vacation destinations from session 1
appeared on screen side by side for 4 s. Then the word “choose” appeared
on screen above the two options for 2 additional seconds. The partici-
pants were instructed to indicate which location they would prefer to
vacation at next year by pressing one of two buttons on the right button
boxwhen theword “choose” cameup. Aftermaking a response a star sign
appeared next to the chosen location. Finally a fixation cross was pre-
sented for 3 s. Choices were of course hypothetical, because participants
did not actually receive the vacations they picked.
Pairs were determined by a Matlab program such that 2/3 of the
trials included two options that were rated the same in session 1 (the
critical condition: difficult choice), and the rest (1/3 of the trials) in-
cluded two options that were rated differently in session 1 (the noncrit-
ical condition: easy choice). The number of trials in the critical condition
was double than in the noncritical condition to maximize the power of
finding differences pre- and postchoice in this condition of interest (dif-
ficult choice condition). Each stimulus appeared in only one pair. Reac-
tion times for making the “difficult choices” (0.6 s) were longer than for
making the “easy choices” (0.5 s; t(12) 2.45; p 0.05).
Only behavioral data from this session was used in data analysis. Spe-
cifically, the choices made during this session were used to classify the
trials in scan 1 and 3 into trials of subsequently (and previously) selected
stimuli, and subsequently (and previously) rejected stimuli.
Scanning session 4was a 4min visual-motor task, distinct from the rest
of our experiment, in which a fixation cross was presented for 6 s and
than a circle was presented for 2 s. The participants had to press the right
button box each time the circle appeared. Data from this scan are not
reported here.
Postscanning questions. After the scanning session, participants were
asked to rate all stimuli on four scales: Previous visits (have you been to
this location before? From 0  never to 6  lived there); Familiarity
(Regardless of previous visits, how familiar is this location to you from
books/TV/films? From 1 low to 6 high); Vividness (when you imag-
ine going on vacation to this location how vivid is your image? From 1
low to 6 high); and Arousal (when you imagine going on vacation to
this location how emotionally arousing is your image? From 1 low to
6  high). Postscanning data of one participant were lost because of a
computer error.
Behavioral analysis
First, the mean rating was calculated for each rating session and partici-
pant. Then the distance of each rating from the mean was computed for
each trial, and the difference in scores between prechoice and postchoice
ratings was calculated for each stimulus. These difference scores were
then submitted to a 2 (decision: chosen/rejected) by 2 (condition: diffi-
cult choice/easy choice) ANOVA, followed by planned t tests. The same
analysis was implemented for the difference of raw scores between pre-
choice and postchoice ratings. Ratings from the four follow-up questions
were also submitted to a 2 by 2ANOVAas above (see supplemental Table
1, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material, for all
scores).
MRI scanning and data analysis
The study was conducted at the Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimag-
ing at University College London using a 3T Siemens Allegra scanner
equipped with a Siemens head coil. Anatomical images were acquired
using MPRAGE scans, which were followed by 1-mm-thick axial slices
parallel to the AC–PC plane. Functional scans used a gradient echo se-
quence, TR 2.7 s, TE 30ms, FA 90, matrix 64 64, FOV 192
mm, slice thickness  2 mm. A total of 42 axial slices (30° tilt) were
sampled for whole brain coverage. The in-plane resolution was 3 mm
3 mm.
Imaging data were analyzed for the rating sessions (scans 1 and 3).
Statistical ParametricMapping (SPM5;Wellcome Trust Centre for Neu-
roimaging, London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was used to
analyze the fMRI data. Images were realigned with the first volume (after
discarding the first six dummy volumes) and unwarped, normalized to a
standard EPI template based on the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) reference brain, resampled to 2 2 2mm3 voxels, and spatially
smoothed (8 mm FWHM).
For all analyses we report results in a priori regions of interest (stria-
tum, nucleus accumbens, amygdala, OFC, VMPFC, anterior cingulate
cortex) previously identified in neuroimaging studies of reward process-
ing, reward expectation (O’Doherty et al., 2002; Delgado et al., 2003;
Gottfried et al., 2003; O’Doherty, 2004; Delgado, 2007; Seymour et al.,
2007), and simulation of future positive events (Sharot et al., 2007;
D’Argembeau et al., 2008). Activations in other regions are reported in
the supplemental tables, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material.
Two main analyses were performed. First, for each participant a time
series was created indicating the temporal position of stimuli onset (the
appearance of the vacation destination name) to stimuli offset. These
time series were included in a parametric modulation analysis (random
effects GLM) on all trials from session 1 and 3 using the participants’
ratings on each trial as the covariate in an ANCOVA ( p  0.0005, un-
corrected;150 contiguous voxels). A relatively stringent threshold was
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used, because the power for this analysis was greater than all subsequent
analyses, since all 160 trials were included. Trials were modeled as 6 s
“mini blocks”.
Second, trials from session 1 (prechoice) and session 3 (postchoice)
were classified into six groups according to the participants’ choices dur-
ing session 2. These included the four critical groups from the difficult
choice condition: (1) selected stimuli prechoice (trials in session 1 of
stimuli that were later presented in the difficult choice condition in ses-
sion 2 and selected by the participant out of the two options), (2) rejected
stimuli prechoice (trials in session 1 of stimuli thatwere later presented in
the difficult choice condition in session 2 and rejected by the participant),
(3) selected stimuli postchoice (trials in session 3 of stimuli that were
previously presented in the difficult choice condition in session 2 and
selected), (4) rejected stimuli postchoice (trials in session 3 of stimuli that
were previously presented in the difficult choice condition in session 2
and rejected). For the non critical condition (easy choice), data from
sessions 1 and 3 were combined. Because the number of trials in the
noncritical conditionwas one-half than in the critical condition (difficult
choice) collapsing allowed an equal amount of trials across the different
bins, and a sufficient number of trials for data analysis in the noncritical
condition. Thus, the two remaining bins were: selected stimuli noncrit-
ical condition (trials in session 1 and 3 of stimuli that were presented in
the easy choice condition in session 2 and selected), rejected stimuli
noncritical condition (trials in session 1 and 3 of stimuli that were pre-
sented in the easy choice condition in session 2 and rejected). For each
participant a time series was created indicating the temporal position of
the six different trial types from stimuli onset to stimuli offset.
Random effects GLM analyses were conducted on the data of all par-
ticipants ( p  0.001; uncorrected). First, we contrasted blood oxygen-
ation level-dependent (BOLD) signal during each rating scan (prechoice
and postchoice) of trials of stimuli that were selected in the difficult
choice, with trials of stimuli that were rejected. Second, we conducted an
interaction to identify regions in which the difference in BOLD signal
between selected and rejected stimuli was greater after the choice was
made relative to before. A 4 mm3 cube was defined centered around the
peak of activation identified in the above interaction. Within this region
we conducted an analysis of covariance contrasting postchoice BOLD
signal differences between selected and rejected stimuli with prechoice
differences, using each participant’s spread in postchoice rating as a co-
variate [p 0.05, familywise error (FWE) small volume corrected].
For anatomical region of interest (ROI) analysis we extracted themean
parameter estimates averaged across the whole anatomically defined
ROIs for the different trial types, and performed statistical tests on these
values. These regions were defined according to the Talairach Daemon
atlas (Lancaster et al., 1997) using the SPM WFU PickAtlas tool (Mald-
jian et al., 2003).
To identify other voxels in the brain that showed greater BOLD re-
sponses during one trial type than the other, we conducted a whole-brain
exploratory analysis on group data ( p  0.001, uncorrected) using a
random effects GLM.
Results
Consistent with Brehm’s classic results (Brehm, 1956), all our
participants changed their valuations of the options after choos-
ing between alternatives they had initially rated the same. Specif-
ically, mean-corrected hedonic ratings increased after the deci-
sion stage for selected stimuli (t(12)  7.67; p  0.0001) and
decreased for rejected stimuli (t(12) 2.8; p 0.02). Although the
mean expected hedonic outcome of selected and rejected stimuli
in the difficult choice condition did not differ before a choice was
made, significant differences emerged postchoice (t(12)  18.1;
p 0.0001). In contrast, ratings of stimuli presented in the easy
choice condition, in which a choice was made between two dif-
ferently rated stimuli, remained unchanged postchoice. Figure 1
portrays the results of the analysis described above for the differ-
ence scores between prechoice and postchoice mean-corrected
ratings. The same analysis was implemented for the difference of
raw scores between prechoice and postchoice ratings, revealing
the same pattern of results. The mean scores for all ratings (in-
cluding postscanning ratings) and statistical analysis are pre-
sented in supplemental Table 1, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material.
We next examinedwhether BOLD responses in regions impli-
cated in reward processing tracked expectations of future hedo-
nic reaction during imagination. Using hedonic ratings as a co-
variate, we conducted a parametric modulation analysis on data
from all 160 prechoice and postchoice trials ( p 0.0005, uncor-
rected; 150 contiguous voxels). Significant positive correla-
tions betweenBOLD signal andhedonic ratingswere found in the
caudate nucleus bilaterally (Talairach coordinates of peak voxel:
R: 16, 24, 8 and 22, 16, 25; L: 10, 22, 1) (Fig. 2a), a region
previously related to reward processing and reward anticipation
(Delgado, 2007). We also observed significant effects in left
amygdala (22, 8, 8) (Fig. 2b) as well as in left pregenual
anterior cingulate cortex (14, 48, 6) (Fig. 2c). All of these
regions have previously been shown to be engaged when partici-
pants imagined positive future events (Sharot et al., 2007;
D’Argembeau et al., 2008). For exploratory parametric modula-
tion analysis outside the ROIs, see supplemental Table 2, avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material.
To test whether activity in these regions specifically tracked
differences in estimated hedonic reaction to the stimuli, rather
than other potential differences inherent to the stimuli, we in-
cluded ratings of arousal, vividness, familiarity, and previous vis-
its to these locations as covariates in our parametric modulation
analysis. This more stringent analysis revealed that activity in the
caudate nucleus bilaterally correlated with estimated hedonic re-
action even when controlling for ratings of arousal, vividness,
familiarity, and previous visits ( p  0.0005, 150 voxels) (Fig.
3a). In contrast, these additional regressors accounted for suffi-
cient variance in the response of amygdala andpregenual anterior
cingulate voxels that the correlation with expected hedonic reac-
tion was no longer significant at this threshold. Thus, during
imagination of a future event, BOLD signal in the caudate nu-
cleus appears to specifically track a physiological signature of
estimated hedonic reaction.
Next, we asked whether activity in areas related to reward
processing reflect subsequent choice. To test this, we contrasted
the BOLD signal from the prechoice scan for trials of stimuli that
were later selected with that for trials of stimuli that were later
Figure 1. Postchoice changes in estimated hedonic experience. When a difficult choice was
made between two equally rated stimuli (critical condition) ratings of estimated happiness
increased postchoice for selected stimuli, and decreased for rejected stimuli. The bars represent
the difference in mean corrected ratings from prechoice scan to postchoice scan. These are
significantly different from zero only in the critical condition. When an easy choice was made
between two differently rated stimuli (noncritical condition) ratings for both selected and re-
jected stimuli remained the same before and after choice. Error bars represent SEM. *Signifi-
cantly different from zero ( p 0.05, two tailed).
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rejected in the difficult choice condition. Note that this com-
parison is between stimuli that had been given the same rat-
ings of estimated hedonic reaction prechoice. We found
greater BOLD signal in the right and left caudate nucleus for
stimuli that were subsequently selected in the difficult choice
versus those subsequently rejected (peak voxel: R: 6, 2, 12; L:
6, 4, 12; p  0.001, uncorrected). The mean parameter esti-
mate of BOLD signal averaged over the whole anatomically
defined right caudate nucleus was significantly greater for
stimuli later selected in the difficult choice relative to stimuli
that were later rejected ( p  0.05) (Fig. 3b). No significant
effects were found in any other a priori regions of interest for
this contrast, nor did any voxels in these regions show the
opposite effect (i.e., where activity was greater for stimuli later
rejected vs stimuli later selected). The clear implication is that
during the initial imagination session, differences in BOLD
response within the caudate nucleus reflect subsequent choice.
Our behavioral results demonstrated that after making
choices the participants’ assessments of the alternatives changed
to fit more closely with their decisions. Specifically, ratings of
estimated hedonic reaction were greater for selected stimuli rel-
ative to rejected stimuli only after a choice was made (i.e., during
the last session). To examine whether these changes were also
reflected in BOLD signal, we tested for an interaction that high-
lights areas showing a greater difference in activity between se-
lected and rejected stimuli after a difficult choice was made (i.e.,
in the last scan) relative to before (i.e., in the first scan). This
critical analysis revealed a significant effect in right caudate nu-
cleus (peak voxel: 20,24, 24; p 0.001, uncorrected) (see sup-
plemental note, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material). To ensure this interaction was not restricted to dorsal
posterior region of the caudate, which is somewhat distant from
the caudate regions that typically show reward effects in other
studies (Delgado, 2007), and is distant from the peak voxel show-
ing a correlation with hedonic ratings in the present study, we
used the results of the parametric modulation analysis to define a
small volume in a more anterior/ventral region of the caudate
nucleus. Specifically, we defined a cluster ( p  0.001, uncor-
rected) in anatomically defined right caudate nucleus that
showed the greatest correlation with hedonic ratings after con-
trolling for ratings of arousal, vividness, familiarity, and previous
visits. Examining within this cluster revealed a significant inter-
action (peak voxel: 10, 22, 0; p  0.05, FWE small volume
corrected).
Furthermore, BOLD signal in the right caudate nucleus dur-
ing the last scan was greater while imagining previously chosen
stimuli, relative to previously rejected stimuli in the critical con-
dition (peak voxel: 14,4, 22; p 0.001, uncorrected), and the
mean parameter estimate of BOLD signal averaged over the
whole anatomically defined right caudate nucleus was greater for
stimuli that were previously selected in the difficult choice rela-
tive to stimuli that were previously rejected ( p 0.05) (Fig. 3d).
Across individuals, the difference in BOLD signal between se-
lected and rejected stimuli during the postchoice scan relative to
the prechoice scan correlated with participants’ postchoice
change in ratings (peak voxel: 18, 20, 26; r  0.63; p  0.05,
FWE small volume correction using a 4 mm3 cube centered
around the peak interaction contrast in the caudate) (Fig. 3d).
Thus, participants who were more inclined to reevaluate their
ratings postchoice showed greater changes in caudate nucleus
activity.
No significant interaction was found in any other a priori
region, nor did any of these regions show the opposite effect (i.e.,
where difference in activity between selected and rejected stimuli
were greater prechoice than postchoice). Together, these findings
suggest that activity in the caudate nucleus tracks expected
hedonic reactions during imagination, reflects subsequent
choice, and importantly, expresses postchoice changes in ex-
pected hedonic value. For exploratory analysis outside the ROIs
in the critical condition, see supplemental Table 3, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material, and for results in
the noncritical condition see supplemental Table 4, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material.
Figure 2. a– c, Brain activity related to estimated hedonic experience. Regions in which
BOLD response was positively correlated with participants’ ratings of estimated hedonic expe-
rience ( p 0.0005, uncorrected;150 contiguous voxels) included the right and left caudate
nucleus, previously associated with reward expectancy (Knutson et al., 2001; Gottfried et al.,
2003) (a), aswell as the left amygdala (b), and left pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (c), both
previously shown to be engagedwhen imagining positive future autobiographical events (Sha-
rot et al., 2007; D’Argembeau et al., 2008).
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Discussion
After making a decision, humans often
change their existing preferences to align
more closely with the choice they had just
made. Our behavioral results demonstrate
that even when making hypothetical
choices, with no apparent consequence,
those decisions change assessments of the
hedonic outcome of the alternatives. Spe-
cifically, after making a theoretical choice
between two equally rated vacation desti-
nations, participants deflated the valua-
tion of the unchosen options while inflat-
ing evaluations of the chosen options.
Using fMRI we have identified the
physiological expression of these choice-
induced preference modifications. Our
findings reveal that postchoice changes in
preference are reflected in caudate nucleus
activity, suggesting that the biological rep-
resentation of a stimulus’ expected hedo-
nic value is altered by a commitment to it.
Furthermore, before any revaluation in-
duced by the decision process, our data
show that BOLD signal in this same region
reflects the choices we are likely to make.
The caudate nucleus is one of themajor
targets for the brain’s dopaminergic sys-
tem (Wise and Rompre, 1989), and has a
well documented role in reward process-
ing, reward expectation and reward learn-
ing (Delgado, 2007). For example, in-
creased activity in the caudate is associated with anticipation of
both primary (Gottfried et al., 2003) and monetary (Knutson et
al., 2001) rewards. In addition, two recent studies have reported
increased activation in the caudate nucleus when imagining pos-
itive future events relative to negative future events (Sharot et al.,
2007; D’Argembeau et al., 2008).
Consistent with these previous studies, in the current experi-
ment the caudate nucleus emerged as the key brain region that
tracked participants’ ratings of expected hedonic consequences.
Thus, the finding that activity in the caudate nucleus is greater
while participants imagined vacationing in destinations they later
selected relative to those they later rejected, before even knowing
they will be required to make choices, suggests that the decision
between equally rated destinations was not arbitrary. Rather, the
decision was seemingly predetermined by differences in expected
hedonic outcome as reflected in caudate activity during imagina-
tion. The caudate nucleus seems to be coding hedonic preference
with a greater sensitivity than the rating scale used in the study.
Note, that our data cannot determine whether the caudate nu-
cleus response is reflective of hedonic experience during imagi-
nation (i.e., the pleasure we feel at the moment from imagining
ourselves on a beach in Thailand), or strictly representing expect-
ancies of hedonic outcome that are not experienced in the actual
present.
The differences in BOLD signal associated with subsequent
choice were not captured in the initial preference rating.We note
that this finding grounds in neurobiology an explicit prediction
from revealed preference theory inmicroeconomics (Samuelson,
1938), where it is axiomatic that preferences are most reliably
indexed by the observable actions of a consumer (i.e., purchasing
choices).Our findings donot necessarily imply that differences in
preference are not consciously accessible prechoice. Indeed, the
very fact that a preference was not expressed behaviorally in the
prechoice scan does not mean that it was not experienced. For
example, these differences may not have been large enough pre-
choice to be captured behaviorally using standard ratings. Impor-
tantly, however, postchoice differences in preferences became
large enough to be observed using the same rating scale. The
critical finding is that after a decision was made, the difference in
caudate nucleus activity associated with the selected, versus the
rejected, option was further enhanced. This difference was now
revealed in participants’ explicit behavioral assessment of hedo-
nic outcome. The finding that postchoice change in ratings is
reflected in a parallel change in the activity profile within the
caudate nucleus suggests that the stimulus’ representation of ex-
pected hedonic value is altered by choice.
Imagination serves an important adaptive function by allow-
ing us to simulate and predict the outcome of an infinite number
of possible future scenarios. Such flexibility goes beyondwhat can
be learned frombehavior alone, and allows us to prepare for what
is yet to come. Specifically, simulating future events enables us to
“prefeel” the pleasures and pains those events are likely to engen-
der. These responses can be used as proxies for the actual hedonic
reactions we are likely to experience should those events actually
occur, and thus guide which actions to avoid and which to exe-
cute (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). This ability is especially crucial
for decision making in instances when the value of possible op-
tions are not easily distinguishable.
In accord with the above model, the current study highlights
how the brain predicts an event’s hedonic consequence, suggest-
ing that during imagination a response generated in a subcortical
Figure 3. a–d, Activity in the caudate nucleus mediating the relation between choice and estimated hedonic experience. a,
After controlling for ratings of arousal, vividness, familiarity, and previous visits, a parametric modulation analysis still reveals
significant correlation between BOLD signal in the caudate nucleus and ratings of estimated hedonic reaction ( p 0.0005,
uncorrected;150 contiguous voxels). The difference in mean parameter estimate for selected stimuli minus rejected stimuli,
averaged across the whole anatomically defined right caudate nucleus, was significantly different from zero both before the
difficult choicewasmade (b) andafter the choicewasmade (c).d, Enhancement inBOLD signal for selected versus rejected stimuli
in the caudate nucleus after making the difficult choice relative to before, correlated with postchoice spread in hedonic rating
across individuals (Talairach coordinates: 18,20, 26; r 0.63; p 0.05, FWE small volume correction using a 4 mm3 cube
centered around the caudate peak in the interaction contrast). Error bars represent SEM. *Significantly different from zero ( p
0.05, two tailed).
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region strongly implicated in reward processing conveys ex-
pected pleasure from the simulated event. This signal reflects a
later action when an individual is faced with a difficult decision
between two apparently equally desirable options. What is in-
triguing is that this signal is altered by the ensuing choice such
that the difference in caudate nucleus activity associated with the
selected and discarded stimuli is enhanced after a decision is
taken, reflecting the choice that had just been made.
Although it is possible that postchoice reevaluation is driven
by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), it is
also feasible that reevaluation occurs because envisioning com-
peting possibilities provides a new context in which the stimuli
are assessed. Specifically, making a choice highlights the unique
aspects of the two alternatives (Tversky, 1972; Houston et al.,
1991). Thus, the act of choosing may change preference by pro-
viding new weights to aspects of the stimuli that may not have
been considered thoroughly before.
Our findings suggest a model in which explicit postchoice
reevaluation involves modification of the expected affective he-
donic response to the stimulus. This mechanism may serve an
adaptive purpose by increasing an individual’s commitment to
the action taken. It is interesting to speculate that in the absence
of a rapid update of value that concurs with choice, we are likely
to second-guess our decisions and actions, which may promote
negative affect and interfere with our daily function.
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